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Abstract
We consider the distributed channel selection problem in the context of device-to-device (D2D)
communication as an underlay to a cellular network. Underlaid D2D users communicate directly by
utilizing the cellular spectrum but their decisions are not governed by any centralized controller. Selfish
D2D users that compete for access to the resources construct a distributed system, where the transmission
performance depends on channel availability and quality. This information, however, is difficult to
acquire. Moreover, the adverse effects of D2D users on cellular transmissions should be minimized.
In order to overcome these limitations, we propose a network-assisted distributed channel selection
approach in which D2D users are only allowed to use vacant cellular channels. This scenario is modeled
as a multi-player multi-armed bandit game with side information, for which a distributed algorithmic
solution is proposed. The solution is a combination of no-regret learning and calibrated forecasting,
and can be applied to a broad class of multi-player stochastic learning problems, in addition to the
formulated channel selection problem. Analytically, it is established that this approach not only yields
vanishing regret (in comparison to the global optimal solution), but also guarantees that the empirical
joint frequencies of the game converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
Index Terms
Calibrated forecaster, channel selection, correlated equilibrium, learning, underlay device-to-device
communication.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Related Works
D2D communication underlying cellular networks enables wireless devices to communicate
directly instead of through an access point or a base station (BS), provided that such transmissions
do not disturb prioritized cellular transmissions [1]. This concept has been proposed to (i) boost
the overall network efficiency expressed in terms of radio resources, and (ii) to provide users
with more reliable services at lower costs [2].
Similar to other wireless networking scenarios, spectrum resource management is a key compo-
nent of D2D communication systems, and may be studied within two different frameworks. The
first framework, adapted by [3], [4] and [5] among many others, considers D2D and cellular
systems as the two parts of a single entity with resources allocated by some BS, which is
assumed to be in possession of global channel and network knowledge. The second framework,
in contrast, considers a hierarchical relationship, where cellular and D2D systems are regarded
as primary and secondary systems, respectively, and the resource allocation for the D2D system
is performed in a distributed manner. This viewpoint can be found some literatures including
[6], [7], [8] and [9].
Since conventional pilot signals cannot be used for estimation of D2D channels, the assumption
of precise D2D channel information availability at some BS is not realistic. As a result, we argue
in favor of the second framework described before, and we assume that D2D users establish
a secondary distributed network that is allowed to use vacant spectrum resources of cellular
network, thereby causing no interference to primary users. In this context, a vast majority of
schemes, including those proposed by papers mentioned above, have some game-theoretical basis.
Most of the game-theoretical models, however, require that the players know at least their own
utility function. Moreover, statistical knowledge on channel gains and/or traffic model should
be available. If not, they either require heavy information exchange among users (buyer-seller
market models [10], cooperative game models [11]), and/or a coordinator (auctions [12]). In
addition, since game-theoretical framework (cooperative or non-cooperative) requires all game
parties to be known by each other, provision of required information is extremely costly. In order
to address these shortcomings, one approach is to incorporate learning theory, as performed in
the context of cognitive radio networks. Some works, for instance [13], [14] and [15], consider
3single-agent learning scenarios, while others study opportunistic spectrum access in multi-agent
learning setting. In such setting, agents have access to strictly limited or even no information,
and the objective is to satisfy some optimality condition. In what follows, we discuss some of
these works in more details.
In [16], opportunistic spectrum access is formulated as a multi-agent learning game. In this
work, it is assumed that upon availability, each channel pays the same reward to all users. This
assumption, however, is strictly restrictive as it neglects channel qualities. On the other hand,
if a channel is selected by multiple users, orthogonal spectrum access is applied, and therefore
interference is neglected. In [17] and [18], authors consider the interference minimization game
for partially overlapping channels. In these works, it is assumed that interference emerge only
between neighboring users, and the proposed learning approaches are based on graphical games.
In addition, in the three works mentioned above, the designed game is proven to be an exact
potential game so that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. It can be thus concluded that the
generalization of proposed approaches as well as convergence analyses is not straightforward. In
[19], two approaches are proposed to achieve Nash equilibrium in a multi-player cognitive envi-
ronment. System verification, however, is only based on numerical approaches. Other examples
are [20], [21] and [22]. In these works, channel qualities are taken into account; nonetheless,
it is assumed that in case of collision, no reward is paid to colliding users. Thus, interference
is again neglected. Moreover, in the proposed algorithms, learning and channel selection are
two independent procedures; while the former follows multi-armed bandit scenario, the latter is
formulated as bipartite graph matching. This decoupling yields unnecessary complexity, and it is
also not clear whether the final solution is stable or not, which is the main concern of equilibrium.
The works [23], [24] and [25] propose various selection schemes to achieve logarithmic regret
as well as fairness among users. However, equilibrium analysis is absent.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we study a multi-player adaptive decision making problem, where selfish players
learn the optimal action from successive interactions with a dynamic environment, and finally
settle at some equilibrium point. This problem appears in many wireless networking scenarios,
with a particular instance being the channel selection in a distributed D2D communication system
integrated into a centralized cellular network. In our setting, each D2D user is selfish and aims
4at optimizing its throughput performance, while being allowed to use vacant cellular channels.
We model this problem as a multi-armed bandit game among multiple learning agents that are
provided with no prior information about channel quality and availability. We propose a channel
selection strategy that consists of two main blocks, namely calibrated forecasting ( [26], [27],
[28]) and no-regret bandit learning ( [29], [30], [31], [32]). Whereas calibrated forecasting is
utilized to predict the joint action profile of selfish rational players, no-regret learning builds a
trust-worthy estimate of the reward generating processes of arms. We show that our proposed
model and selection strategy can be applied to both noise-limited (orthogonal channel access)
and interference-limited (non-orthogonal channel access) transmission models. We prove that the
gap between the average utility achieved by our approach and that of the optimal fixed strategy
converges to zero as the game horizon tends to infinity. Moreover, by using our strategy, the
empirical joint frequencies of play converge to the set of correlated equilibria.
As discussed in Section I-A, the spectrum access problem using learning theory has been under
extensive study in recent years. Nevertheless, our work differs from previous studies in many
aspects, as listed briefly in the following.
• Some works such as [13] and [14] analyze single-agent learning problem. In some others
such as [20] and [21], although multi-agent problem is formulated, no explicit equilibrium
analysis is performed. We, however, propose an algorithmic solution for multi-agent learning
and show that by applying our approach the empirical joint frequencies of the game converge
to the set of correlated equilibria. As any Nash equilibrium belongs to the set of correlated
equilibria, our solution is more general in comparison to approaches that converge to a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, for example those proposed in [16], [17], [18] and [19].
• The proposed multi-player learning approach can be applied to solve a wide range of
resource allocation problem, including radio resource management, routing, scheduling,
object tracking and so on. This is due to the fact that our convergence analysis does not
depend on utility or cost function. In contrast, References [16], [17] and [18] require the
game be an exact potential game for an equilibrium to be achieved by proposed approaches,
and hence the applicability of these approaches is strictly restricted.
• In our problem setting, both noise-limited and interference-limited transmission models are
studied, and do not impose any limitation on the interference pattern. This is in contrast with
5[21], [17] and [18], where the interference is either completely neglected or is limited to
neighboring users. This is important since depending on channel matrices, channel allocation
based on interference avoidance might be suboptimal.
• In our work, channels (or generally, actions) differ for different users. More precisely,
variations in both channel availability and quality is taken into account. This stands in
contrast to [16], where the average gain of each specific channel is assumed to be equal
for all users (deterministic), and only availability is considered to be stochastic.
C. Paper Structure
The paper is organized as follows. Section II includes system model and problem formulation.
In Section III, we present basic elements of bandit games, and model the formulated problem
as a multi-player multi-armed bandit game. Section IV briefly reviews calibrated forecasting.
In Section V, we propose our channel selection strategy. Section VI includes numerical results,
while Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We study a distributed D2D communication system as an underlay to a cellular network. The
D2D system consists of K device pairs referred to as D2D users, denoted by either just k or the
pair (k, k′). The single-cell wireless network is provided with M licensed orthogonal channels.
In such network structure, cellular users1 and D2D users are regarded as primary and secondary,
respectively. As a result, a channel is available to D2D users only if it is not occupied by any
cellular user. D2D users have neither channel (quality and availability) nor network (traffic)
knowledge. We assume that the BS observes the transmission channels of all D2D and cellular
users. D2D users do not exchange information. However, there exists a control channel through
which the BS broadcasts some signals referred to as side information, which is heard by all
D2D users. This assumption is justified by the physical characteristics of the radio propagation
medium. Note that the control channel is occupied only until convergence, and therefore the
overhead remains low. Throughout the paper, huv,m(t) stands for the coefficient of channel m
1Cellular users are those users who communicate via base stations.
6(including Rayleigh fading and path loss) between nodes u and v at time t. The variance of
zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) is denoted by N0.
B. Transmission Model
The transmission structure of D2D users is described in the following. At each transmission
round, D2D user selects a channel to sense (selection phase). For simplicity, we assume that
sensing is perfect. Afterwards transmission phase begins. Primary duration of this phase is
denoted by Tr; however, as we see shortly, the useful transmission time of D2D user depends
on channel availability and the applied multiple access technique. After the transmission phase
announcement phase begins, in which the BS broadcasts D2D indices (IDs) along with indices
of their selected channels. Consequently, all D2D users know which users have transmitted in
each channel.2 This phase is followed by learning phase. In the learning phase, every D2D
user exploits its gathered data, including its achieved throughput and also the received broadcast
message, to learn the environment as well as strategies of other players.
Since all D2D users are allowed to select among M (probably available) channels, collision
might occur. We consider the following multiple access protocols.
• Orthogonal multiple access (noise-limited region): If multiple D2D users select a common
channel, carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) is implemented to address collision issues
[33], [16]. Since interference is avoided, transmissions are corrupted only by AWGN.
Therefore the throughput of some D2D user k transmitting at some channel m yields
Rm,k(t, k
−) =
τm,k(k
−)
Tr
log
(
1 +
P |hkk′,m(t)|2
N0
)
Im, (1)
where k− denotes the set of channels selected by all D2D users except for k, and τm,k(k−)
is a random variable that stands for the useful transmission time of user k through channel
m. The probability density function (pdf) of τm,k(k−) depends on the exact applied CSMA
scheme, and is not calculated here since it impacts neither applicability nor analysis. An
example of such calculations can be found in [16]. Im is a Bernoulli random variable with
parameter θm that indicates whether channel m is occupied by some cellular user or not.
2Later we see that this side information helps D2D users to converge to an efficient stable point.
7• Non-orthogonal multiple access (interference-limited region): If multiple D2D users select
a common channel, they all transmit together, which results in interference. In this case,
the throughput of D2D user k is given by
Rm,k(t, k
−) = log
(
1 +
P |hkk′,m(t)|2
P
∑L(k−)
l=1 |hlk′,m(t)|2 +N0
)
Im, (2)
where L(k−) denotes the number of D2D users that share channel m with user k.
C. Problem Formulation
Let mk,t and k−t respectively denote the selected channel of D2D user k and the set of channels
selected by all D2D users except for k, both at time t, yielding Rmk,t,k(t, k
−
t ). Ideally, at every
time t, D2D user k selects the optimal channel in the sense of maximum throughput, thereby
maximizing its accumulated throughput. Therefore, its ultimate goal can be formulated as
maximize
mk,t∈{1,...,M}
T∑
t=1
Rmk,t,k(t, k
−
t ), (3)
with T being the total transmission time. However, since D2D users have no prior information,
solving (3) can be notoriously difficult or even impossible. Consequently, we argue in favor
of another strategy where each D2D user pursues a less ambitious goal: Minimize its regret,
which is the difference between the throughput that could have been achieved by selecting the
optimal channel (if it were known), and that of the actual selected channel. We formulate this
problem as follows. Let m◦k,t := arg maxm∈{1,..,M}Rm,k(t, k
−
t ) be the optimal channel that yields
a throughput equal to R◦k(t, k
−
t ) := Rm◦k,t,k(t, k
−
t ). Since m◦k,t is not known, D2D user k attempts
to choose a channel whose reward is asymptotically as large as m◦k,t. This can be formalized as
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
Rmk,t,k(t, k
−
t )−R◦k(t, k−t )
)
= 0. (4)
Let fm,k(k−) = Et [Rm,k(t, k−)] < +∞ for m ∈ {1, ...,M}, where Et denotes the expected
value over time. Furthermore, let m∗k,t := arg maxm∈{1,..,M} fm,k(k
−
t ) that results in f ∗k (k
−
t ) :=
fm∗k,t,k(k
−
t ). In [29], it is shown that (4) is equivalent to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
fmk,t,k(k
−
t )− f ∗k (k−t )
)
= 0, (5)
8provided that Rm,k(t, k−) is bounded above and away from zero. In this paper, we assume that
each D2D user k aims at satisfying (5) as the performance metric.
III. BANDIT-THEORETICAL MODEL OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
A. Single-Player and Multi-Player Multi-Armed Bandit
Single-player multi-armed bandit game (SP-MAB, hereafter) is a class of sequential decision
making problems with limited information. In a SP-MAB setting, a player has access to a finite
set of actions (arms, interchangeably). Upon being pulled by the player at time t, each arm,
say arm m ∈ {1, ...,M}, generates a random reward Rm(t) ∈ R+. The player only observes
the reward of the played arm, and not those of other arms. We denote the continuous mean
reward associated with m by fm, m ∈ {1, ...,M}. That is, fm = Et [Rm(t)]. We denote the
optimal arm and its associated mean reward by m∗ and f ∗ respectively, where we define f ∗ :=
maxm∈{1,..,M} fm. The player needs to decide which action to take at successive rounds in a way
that asymptotically the accumulated reward achieved by the played arms is not much less than
that of the optimal arm. Obviously, this problem is an instance of the well-known exploitation-
exploration dilemma, in which a balance should be found between exploiting the arms that
have exhibited good performance in the past (control), and exploring arms that might perform
well in the future (learning). In multi-player multi-armed bandits (MP-MAB, hereafter), this
formulation remains unchanged, and players still face exploration-exploitation dilemma. The
problem, though, becomes more challenging, since in multi-player settings with reward sharing,
the rewards achieved by any player do not only depend on the arms pulled by this player, but also
on actions of other players. Hence, for player k that pulls arm m, the mean reward is denoted by
fm,k(k
−) = Et [Rm,k(t, k−)], where k− denotes the joint action profile of all players other than
k (that is, its opponents), which has MK−1 realizations. In other words, the reward achieved by
player k at time t yields Rmk,t,k(t, k
−
t ), where mk,t denotes the selected action, and k
−
t is the
realization of the joint action profile of opponents, both at time t. At each trial t, for player
k, we denote the optimal arm and its associated mean reward by m∗k,t and f
∗
k (k
−
t ) respectively,
where we have f ∗k (k
−
t ) := maxm∈{1,..,M} fm,k(k
−
t ) and m∗k,t := arg maxm∈{1,..,M} fm,k(k
−
t ). We
assume that fm,k(k−) and f ∗k (k
−) obey the following assumption [29].
9Assumption A1. ∀ k ∈ {1, ..., K}, m ∈ {1, ...,M}, k− ∈ ⊗Kk′=1,k′ 6=k {1, ...,M} (⊗ denotes
the Cartesian product) and t > 0,
a) fm,k(k−) ∈ [0, A] for some A > 0,
b) B = supm supk− (f
∗
k (k
−)− fm,k(k−)) <∞,
c) E(f ∗k (k
−
1 )) > 0.
The last part of the assumption implies that the expected optimal reward is positive at least for
the first round of the game, which is used later to avoid division by zero later. We also assume
that the achieved rewards of any particular player are revealed to that player only, while actions
of players can be observed by their opponents.
At the T -th play, the collection of personal achieved rewards and observed actions up to time
T , are available to each player. The accumulated mean reward of player k up to time T is∑T
t=1 fmk,t,k(k
−
t ), while
∑T
t=1 f
∗
k (k
−
t ) is the optimal total reward of player k, which could have
been achieved by pulling arm m∗k,t for all trials up to T . Since the k-th player would attain
the best performance if it selected at every trial the optimal arm, it is reasonable to evaluate
any selection strategy κ used by player k based on the following performance metric of interest
given by [29]
Sκ,T =
∑T
t=1 fmk,t,k(k
−
t )∑T
t=1 f
∗
k (k
−
t )
≤ 1 , (6)
where
∑T
t=1 f
∗
k (k
−
t ) > 0 by Assumption A1. Clearly, the closer Sκ,T to 1, the better the selection
strategy. Asymptotically as T tends to infinity, the most desired property is strong consistency,
defined below.
Definition 1 ( [29]). A selection strategy κ is strongly consistent if Sκ,T → 1 as T →∞.
Remark 1 ( [29]). If 1
T
∑T
t=1 f
∗
k (k
−
t ) is bounded above and away from 0 with probability 1, then
Sκ,T → 1 almost surely is equivalent to limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1
(
fmk,t,k(k
−
t )− f ∗k (k−t )
)
= 0; referring
to ”fmk,t,k(k
−
t )−f ∗k (k−t )” as ”regret” at time t, this implies that strong-consistency is equivalent
to achieving per-round vanishing (zero-average) regret.
From the game-theoretic point of view, for each player k ∈ {1, ..., K}, an MP-MAB can
be seen as a game with two agents: the first agent is player k itself, and the second agent is
the set of all other K − 1 players whose joint action profile affects the rewards of player k.
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Since the reward of any player k depends on the decisions of other players, a key idea of the
proposed approach is to enable each user to forecast the future actions of its opponents based
on public knowledge. In Section IV, we discuss how reliable forecasting can be performed and
how players should proceed using this side information.
B. Modeling the Channel Selection Problem as Bandit Game
By comparing our system model (Section II) with MP-MAB (Section III-A), we observe that
distributed channel selection problem is in great harmony with MP-MAB settings. Therefore, we
model this problem as an MP-MAB game, in which each D2D user is modeled as a player, while
frequency channels are regarded as arms, and choosing a channel is pulling an arm. Clearly,
the instantaneous reward achieved by any player, which is its attained throughput,3 depends on
the selected channel of the player itself and also on those of other players, with the throughput
given by (1) under orthogonal multiple access strategies and (2) when non-orthogonal strategies
are used. By Remark 1, the goal of D2D users, which is (5), is equivalent to strong-consistency.
IV. CALIBRATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF A CALIBRATED FORECASTER
At each time t, any D2D user k is aware of actions of other K − 1 players up to time t− 1.
Using this knowledge, it attempts to predict the joint action of others at time t, to minimize the
harm of opponents on its reward, by taking the best-response to the predicted joint action profile.
For prediction, we use calibrated forecasting, for a reason that is stated formally in Theorem 1.
This theorem states that by using calibrated forecaster, we ensure the possibility of achieving an
equilibrium point. In what follows, we describe calibrated forecasting briefly.
A. Calibration
Following [26], consider a random experiment with a finite set of outcomes D of cardinality
D, and let δdt stand for the Dirac probability distribution on some outcome d at time t. The set
of probability distributions over D is denoted by P = ∆(D), P ⊆ RD. Equip P with some
norm ‖·‖. At time t, forecaster outputs a probability distribution Pt over the set of outcomes.
3Throughput is considered as an exemplary reward function, and it can be substituted by any other utility or cost function.
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Definition 2 ( [26]). A forecaster is said to be calibrated if ∀  > 0 and ∀ p ∈ P, almost surely,
lim
T→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
I{‖Pt−p‖≤} (Pt − δdt)
∥∥∥∥∥ = 0. (7)
A relaxed notion of calibration is -calibration. Given  > 0, an -calibrated forecaster
considers some finite covering of P by N balls of radius . Denoting the centers of these balls
by p1, ...,pN , the forecaster selects only forecasts Pt ∈ {p1, ...,pN}. Using this, -calibration
is defined as follows.
Definition 3 ( [26]). Define Qt to be the index in {1, ..., N} such that Pt = pQt . A forecaster
is said to be -calibrated if almost surely,
lim sup
T→∞
N∑
q=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
I{Qt=q} (pq − δdt)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ . (8)
Note that none of the two definitions makes any assumption on the nature of the random
experiment whose outcome is being predicted. The following result can be found in [28], [27],
and [30].
Theorem 1. Consider a game with K players provided with M actions. Let C stand for the set
of correlated equilibria, and define the joint empirical frequencies of play as
pˆiT (m) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{Mt=m}, m = (m1, ..,mK) ∈
K⊗
k=1
{1, ..,M} , (9)
where Mt denotes the joint action profile of players at time t, and
⊗
is the Cartesian product.
Now, assume that each player plays by best responding to a calibrated forecast of the opponents
joint action profile in a sequence of plays; that is, for each player k we have
mk,t = arg max
m∈{1,...,M}
D∑
d=1
pd,k,tfm,k(d), (10)
where Pk,t = (p1,k,t, ..., pD,k,t) stands for the output of its forecaster, which is a probability
distribution over D = MK−1 possible joint action profiles of its opponents. Accordingly, each
d represents a realization of the joint action profile of opponents of player k, i.e. k−. Then the
distance infpi∈C
∑
m |pˆiT (m)− pi(m)| between the empirical joint distribution of plays and the set
of correlated equilibria converges to 0 almost surely as T →∞.
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B. Construction of a Calibrated Forecaster
For constructing a calibrated forecaster, an approach is to use doubling-trick [26]. In the first
step, an -calibrated forecaster is constructed for some  > 0. Then, the time is divided into
periods of increasing length, and the procedure of -calibration is repeated as a sub-routine over
periods, where  decreases gradually at each period (that is, N-grid becomes finer), until it
reaches zero. In Algorithm 1, we review this procedure. The proof of calibration follows from
the Blackwell’s approachability theorem. See [26] for details and the proof of calibration.
Theorem 2 ( [26]). The forecasting procedure (Algorithm 1) is calibrated. That is, it satisfies
(7) (and with it (8)).
V. BANDIT GAME
As it is clear from (1) and (2), the throughput performance depends on two factors: 1) channel
quality and availability, which is not affected by D2D users, and 2) number of D2D users
transmitting in each channel, which is determined by the actions of users. Initially, none of
these factors is known and their impact on the reward should be learned over time. For a
D2D user k, the true mean reward function of a channel m ∈ {1, ...,M} can be modeled as
fm,k(k
−) + εm,k, where εm,k denotes a random error with zero mean and finite variance [29],
independent over time, channels and users. Regardless of the type of regression analysis, here
we make the following assumption.
Assumption A2. The regression process is strongly consistent in L∞ norm for each fm,k(k−);
that is, ‖fˆm,k,t(k−) − fm,k(k−)‖∞ → 0, for all 1 ≤ m ≤ M , 1 ≤ k ≤ K and k− ∈⊗K
k′=1,k′ 6=k {1, ...,M}, almost surely as t→∞, where fˆm,k,t(k−) denotes the regression estimate
of fm,k(k−) at the t-th trial.
In Section III-B, we modelled the channel selection as a bandit game. In what follows, we
describe our proposed strategy to solve this game and investigate its convergence characteristics.
A. Selection Strategy
The game horizon is first divided into periods r = 1, 2, ... of increasing length T ′r. Moreover,
we define another sequence Zr for r = 1, 2, ..., so that T ′r and Zr satisfy the following assumption.
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Algorithm 1 A Calibrated Forecaster [26]
1: Define an increasing sequence of integers, Tr = 2r, r = 1, 2, .... Each member Tr of this sequence denotes the
length of period r, i.e. the number of trials included in it.
2: For each period r, let r = 2−r/(D+1).
3: Define a game, where the first player is the forecaster with the action set I = {1, ..., Nr} and the second
player is the nature with action set J = D, |D| = D. The first player is in fact some D2D user k, and the
second player is the set of all other K − 1 D2D users, i.e. its opponents. Moreover, D = MK−1. Also, any
outcome d is the realization of a joint action profile of K − 1 players, that is k−.
4: Define the vector-valued regret of the first player as u {q, d} = (0, ...,0,pq − δd,0, ...,0) for each q ∈
{1, ..., Nr}, d ∈ D.
5: Define the target set F as follows:
• Write (DNr )-dimensional vectors of RDNr as Nr -dimensional vectors with components in RD, i.e.
X =
(
x1, ...,xNr
)
, where xl ∈ RD for all l ∈ {1, ..., Nr}.
• F is a subset of the r-ball around (0, ...,0) for the calibration norm ‖·‖, which is a closed convex set.
(The forecaster is r-calibrated when this set is approachable by the regret vector (see [26] for details)).
6: Define the sequence of the vector-valued regrets up to time T (1 ≤ T ≤ Tr) as
uT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(Qt, dt) =
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
I{Qt=1}(p1 − δt), ...,
T∑
t=1
I{Qt=Nr}(pNr − δt)
)
. (11)
Now, (8) (condition of r-calibration) can be restated as the converges of uTr to the set F almost surely. In the
following, u(r) := uTr denotes the final regret of period r.
7: repeat
8: for t = 1→ Tr do
9: if (r = 1 ∧ t = 1) then
10: Pick up an action Qt from I according to uniform distribution over the action set, i.e. let ψ1 =
( 1Nr
, ..., 1Nr
). Note that ψt is the mixed strategy at time t, while ψ(r) := ψTr denotes the final mixed
strategy of period r.
11: else if (r > 1 ∧ t = 1) then
12: Pick up an action Qt from I according to a probability distribution in a small neighborhood of ψ(r−1)
(localization of search).
13: else
14: Pick up an action Qt from I at random according to a distribution ψt =
{
ψt,1, ..., ψt,Nr
}
on
{1, ..., Nr} such that ∀d ∈ D
(ut−1 −ΠF(ut−1)) · (u(ψt, d)−ΠF(ut−1)) ≤ 0, (12)
where ΠF denotes the projection in l2-norm onto F and · denotes the inner product in RDNr . See
[26] and [34] for details.
15: end if
16: end for
17: Calculate the final regret of the current period, u(r) = uTr . Also, let ψ
(r) = ψTr .
18: if u(r) > r, then
19: • Let r = 1 and t = 1.
20: else
21: • Let r = r + 1 and t = 1.
22: end if
23: until convergence (r has increased enough so that r ≈ 0)
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Assumption A3. {T ′r}r=1,2,... and {Zr}r=1,2,... are selected so that
a) {dT ′rZre}r=1,2,... is an increasing sequence of integers,
b) limR→∞
∑R
r=1 dT ′rZre → ∞,
c) limR→∞
∑R
r=1dT ′rZre∑R
r=1 T
′
r
= 0.
At each period r, dT ′r · Zre randomly-selected trials are devoted to exploration, and the rest
of the trials are used for exploitation, in the following manner.
• Exploitation: In an exploitation trial, say i, every player k first receives a probability
distribution Pi over all possible joint action profiles of other K − 1 players, which is the
output of its forecasting procedure. Based on this information, and by using the estimated
mean reward functions, it selects the action with the highest estimated expected reward;
that is, it acts with the best-response to the predicted joint action profile of its opponents.
• Exploration: In an exploration trial, say j, with probability γ  1, again best-response is
played (see above), while with probability 1−γ, an action is selected uniformly at random.
In all trials, after selection, the player’s estimation of the reward process of the selected action
is upgraded based on the achieved reward. Moreover, actions of other players are observed (here
by hearing the broadcast message). This observation is used by the forecaster, as described in
Algorithm 1. The entire procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Note that in this approach, for larger period indices (large r), the fraction of time dedicated
to exploration is smaller, as depicted in Figure 1(a). Therefore, the strategy belongs to the class
of algorithms that follow the ”greedy in the limit with infinite exploration” (GLIE) principal
[31]. Intuitively, this method is based on the fact that in a (near-) stationary environment, the
estimation of reward processes of arms becomes more and more trust-worthy as time evolves,
and therefore less exploration is required. Also note that the selection strategy and forecasting
perform two different task; while the former refers to the estimation of reward processes, the
latter predicts the joint action profile of opponents. The entire action selection procedure is
visualized in Figure 1(b).
B. Strong-Consistency and Convergence
The following results ensure the consistency and declare the convergence characteristics of
the proposed selection strategy.
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(a) Exemplary exploration-exploitation trade-off. (b) Selection strategy flowchart (Algorithm 2).
Fig. 1. Visualization of the proposed selection strategy.
Algorithm 2 Bandit Selection Strategy (χ)
1: Define an increasing sequence of integers, T ′r = 2
r for r = 1, 2, .... Each member T ′r of this sequence denotes
the length of period r, i.e. the number of trials included in it.
2: Define a decreasing sequence of numbers, Zr = r2r for r = 1, 2, ....
3: Set the period r = 1 and select the exploration parameter γ  1.
4: repeat
5: Select dT ′r · Zre exploration trials belonging to [1 +
∑
r T
′
r−1,
∑
r T
′
r] uniformly at random.
6: for t = s+
∑
r T
′
r−1, 1 ≤ s < T ′r, do
7: if t is an exploring trial, then
8: with probability 1− γ, select an arm equally at random;
with probability γ,
1. receive the output of the forecaster (Algorithm 1),
2. using this information, select the arm with the highest estimated expected reward.
9: else
10: Receive the input from the forecaster.
11: Using this information, select the arm with the highest estimated expected reward.
12: end if
13: Play the selected arm and observe the reward.
14: Observe the actions of other players and inform the forecaster (forecaster’s input).
15: Re-estimate the mean reward function of the played arm.
16: end for
17: r = r + 1.
18: until convergence (r is sufficiently large)
Lemma 1. T ′r = 2r and Zr = r2r satisfy Assumption A3.
Proof: The lemma can be easily verified by direct calculation using theorems concerning
limits of infinite sequences.
Lemma 2. Consider a selection strategy κ so that each player k plays with actions based on
δdt (mk,t = κ(δdt)), where δdt is the Dirac probability distribution on the true joint action profile
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of its opponents at time t. Let κ′ be another strategy that is identical to κ, except that Pt is
used in the place of δdt (mk,t = κ(Pt)), where Pt is a probability distribution over all possible
joint action profiles of opponents, produced by a calibrated forecaster. Then, limT→∞ Sκ,T = 1
implies limT→∞ Sκ′,T = 1, where Sκ,T and Sκ′,T are defined by (6).
Proof: See Appendix VIII-A.
Lemma 2 simply states that if a strategy is strongly consistent given true joint action profiles,
then its consistency is preserved by using the calibrated forecast of the joint action profiles.
Lemma 3. Asymptotically, the selection strategy χ samples each action m ∈ {1, ...,M} and
also each joint action profile m = (m1, ...,mK) ∈
⊗K
k=1 {1, ...,M} infinitely often.
Proof: See Appendix VIII-B.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3, the proposed selection strategy, χ (Algorithm
2), is strongly-consistent.
Proof: See Appendix VIII-C.
Theorem 4. Consider a K-player MAB game where each player is provided with M actions.
Let C denote the set of correlated equilbria, m = (m1, ..,mK) ∈
⊗K
k=1 {1, ..,M}, and define
the empirical joint frequencies of play as (9). If all players play according to selection strategy
χ, then the distance infpi∈C
∑
m |pˆiT (m)− pi(m)| between the empirical joint distribution of plays
and the set of correlated equilibria converges to 0 almost surely as T →∞.
Proof: See Appendix VIII-D.
Remark 2. In Section III-B, we mentioned that every player is interested in optimizing its
performance in the sense of regret minimization, and no player intends to ruin the performance
of others. Therefore players are rational and not malicious. By Remark 1 and Theorem 3, strategy
χ yields vanishing regret; Thus the assumption that all players use this strategy is justified.
C. Some Notes on Convergence Rate
As it is clear from Algorithm 2 (see also Figure 1(b)), for final convergence, the forecasting
and regression procedures must converge to true joint action profile and true reward functions,
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respectively. In what follows, we discuss the impact of some variables, including number of
actions (M ) and users (K), as well as exploration parameter (γ), on the convergence rate of
these procedures.
Theorem 5 ( [26]). For the calibrated forecaster given in Algorithm 1 we have
lim sup
T→∞
T
1
D+1√
ln(T )
sup
B∈B
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
IPt∈B(Pt − δdt)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ΓD, (13)
where B is the Borel sigma-algebra of P and the constant ΓD depends only on D.
From the algorithm we know that D = M (K−1) > 1. Figure 2(a) shows how the convergence
rate scales with D for ΓD = D. As expected, convergence speed decreases for larger number of
users K and/or actions M , thereby larger D. Note that the effect of increasing K on D is more
than that of M .
Now, consider the regression process, which is assumed to be non-parametric. Then the
following holds.
Theorem 6 ( [35]). Consider a p-times differentiable unknown regression function f and a d-
dimensional measurement variable. Let fˆ denote an estimator of f based on a training sample
of size n, and let
∥∥∥fˆn − f∥∥∥∞ be the L∞ norm fˆn − f . Under appropriate regularity condition,
the optimal rate of convergence for
∥∥∥fˆn − f∥∥∥∞ to zero is ( log(n)n )η where η = p2p+d .
Based on Theorem 6, Algorithm 2 changes the convergence rate through changing the sampling
rate. Assume that samples are gathered only at exploration trials. Let R be the number of
periods (game horizon). By the algorithm, each joint action profile is expected to be played
1−γ
MK
∑R
r=1 r =
1−γ
MK
· R(R+1)
2
times during R periods (see also the proof of Lemma 3). Moreover,
suppose that some fixed number of samples are required to estimate the reward of each joint
action profile with some precision. Therefore, it is clear that increasing M and/or K, as well as
increasing γ, degrades the sampling rate and thereby the convergence speed, since larger game
horizon is required for sufficient sampling. Let B = 1−γ
MK
< 1. Figure 2(b) shows how changes
in B impact the convergence speed of regression process.
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Fig. 2. Scaling convergence rate with variables and parameters (M , K and γ), D = M (K−1) > 1 and B = 1−γ
MK
< 1.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section consists of two parts. First, we consider a simple model, and clarify how the
algorithm works. Next we consider some larger network and the performance of the proposed
approach is compared with some other approaches.
A. Part One
1) Network model: We consider an underlay D2D network consisting of two D2D users
(K = 2). We assume that there exist two primary channels (M = 2), whose availability follows
Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1
2
. We implement the following selection strategies.
• Statistical centralized strategy (SC): Given global statistical channel knowledge and by
exhaustive search, a central controller assigns each D2D user some transmission channel
so that the assignment corresponds to the most efficient pure strategy equilibrium point in
the sense of maximum aggregate average throughput.
• Calibrated bandit strategy (CB): Provided with no prior information, D2D users simultane-
ously utilize the selection strategy χ, described in Algorithm 2.
Since M = 2, for each D2D user k ∈ {1, 2} we have pk,1 + pk,2 = 1, where pk,i is the
likelihood of D2D user k to take action i ∈ {1, 2} by following the mixed strategy (pk,1, pk,2).
This implies that there exists only one degree of freedom in the -grid of forecasters, i.e. for
each player k the probability distribution over all joint action profiles of opponents reduces here
19
to the mixed strategy of the other player. We assume N = 40.4 Therefore, the -grid defines 40
possible mixed strategies (quantized vectors).5 The primal output of the forecaster of a player is
a vector of weights including 40 elements, where each element denotes the likelihood of one of
the quantized mixed strategies to be played by the other player. The final output of the forecaster
is then a mixed strategy extracted from the set of quantized mixed strategies according to this
distribution, as described in Algorithm 1.
2) Orthogonal Multiple Access: Assume that D2D users follow the orthogonal transmission
scheme, described in Section II. Based on average channel gains, the joint rewards of players
under possible joint action profiles are summarized in Table I. From this table, the channel
selection game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium6 that yields the maximum aggregate reward
for the two D2D users, and is achieved when D2D users 1 and 2 transmit in the first and second
channels respectively (i.e. joint action (1,2)).
The average throughput achieved by each player is depicted in Figure 3. It can be seen that
TABLE I
JOINT REWARD TABLE (ORTHOGONAL ACCESS)
channel 1 2
1 0.012,0.000 0.023,0.054
2 0.016,0.000 0.008,0.027
for sufficiently large game horizon (number of periods), the average throughput of our strategy
converges to that of equilibrium. Actions of players are shown in Figure 4, at both early and
final stages of the game, i.e. before and after the convergence, for 10 consecutive trials. By
comparing this figure with the data given in Table I, it follows that the game converges to
equilibrium, which is the joint action (1, 2). Moreover, the primal outputs of forecasters (ψ,
see Algorithm 1) are shown in Figure 5(a), for some trial before convergence. In this figure,
outputs are almost uniformly distributed, meaning that all quantized mixed strategies are almost
4In general, smaller N can be used at early periods to reduce the computational burden. In this example, however, we fix
N for all periods in order to highlight the evolution of outputs over time.
5Vectors are indexed as i = 1, ..., 40. For i = 1, (p1, p2) = (0, 1), while for i = 40, (p1, p2) = (1, 0). That is, p1 increases
with the index of quantized vector, while p2 decreases.
6Note that Nash equilibrium is a special case of correlated equilibrium.
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Fig. 3. Average throughput of our approach versus that of centralized strategy (orthogonal access).
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Fig. 4. Selected actions before and after convergence (orthogonal access).
equally likely to occur. This result is in agreement with Figure 4, where selected channels before
convergence do not follow any specific pattern. On the other hand, outputs of forecasters at some
trial after convergence are depicted in Figure 5(b). In this figure, Forecaster 1 assigns higher
weights to quantized mixed strategies with p2 > p1, while Forecaster 2 emphasizes the strategies
with p1 > p2. This means that first and second players are excepted to select channels 1 and 2,
respectively, by their opponents. These predictions are again approved by Figure 4, where first
and second D2D users finally settle at first and second channels, respectively.
3) Non-orthogonal Multiple Access: As described in Section II, in case of non-orthogonal
multiple access, conflicting D2D users transmit simultaneously, which might result in interfer-
ence. In this scenario, players decide whether to solve the conflict by diverting to different
channels, or to transmit in a common channel. In order to clarify this, we perform two exper-
iments. For the first and second experiments, joint rewards are given by Table I(a) and Table
I(b), respectively. From these tables, the most efficient pure-strategy equilibrium points for the
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Fig. 5. Forecasters’ outputs (orthogonal access).
(a) Case 1
channel 1 2
1 0.024,0.040 0.024,0.021
2 0.075,0.042 0.063,0.021
(b) Case 2
channel 1 2
1 0.024,0.001 0.024,0.021
2 0.075,0.000 0.063,0.021
TABLE II
JOINT REWARD TABLE (NON-ORTHOGONAL ACCESS)
first and second games are joint actions (2, 1) and (2, 2) respectively. This means that in the first
case, it is beneficial for players transmit in different channels, while in the second case, D2D
users achieve higher gains if both transmit through the second channel.
The achieved throughput by players are shown in Figures 6(a) and 6(b), respectively for the
two experiments. Moreover, Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show the actions of players for first and second
experiments. Figures 8(a) and 8(b), at a single trial after convergence (the outputs of forecasters
before convergence are similar to Figure 5(a)). Descriptions are similar to the orthogonal case,
and are omitted for space considerations.
B. Part Two
Consider a D2D network with 4 users and 4 primary channels. The performance metric is the
aggregate average throughput of users, and the following approaches are compared.
• Statistical centralized strategy (SC) : This approach is described in Section VI-A1.
22
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Periods
Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
User 1
 
 
SC
CB
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Periods
Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
User 2
 
 
SC
CB
(a) Case 1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Periods
Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
User 1
 
 
SC
CB
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Periods
Av
er
ag
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
User 2
 
 
SC
CB
(b) Case 2
Fig. 6. Average throughput of our approach versus that of equilibrium (non-orthogonal access).
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Fig. 7. Selected actions before and after convergence (non-orthogonal access).
• Calibrated bandit strategy (CB): This is our proposed selection strategy (Algorithm 2).
• No collision bandit strategy (NCB): Following [21], stochastic multi-armed bandit game is
played, where in case of collision, no reward is assigned to colliding users.
• -greedy Q-learning strategy (GQL): Let 0 <  < 1. Each player assigns some Q-value to
each action-state pair. At each trial, every player selects the action that has yield the largest
Q-value so far with probability 1− , and an action uniformly at random with probability .
After playing, the Q-value of the selected action and observed state is updated [36]. Note
that no forecasting is performed, thus the best-response dynamics cannot be applied.
• Availability-based Strategy (AB) : As described in [16], this model ignores the role of
channel qualities in the reward achieved by players. More precisely, the learning approach
includes only the availability of channels and the number of users willing to transmit through
each channel.
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Fig. 8. Forecasters’ outputs after convergence (non-orthogonal access).
• Uniformly Random Strategy (UR): At each trial, an action is selected uniformly at random.
Results are depicted in Figure 9, and discussed briefly in the following.
• CB requires some time to converge to the average throughput achieved by SC. It yields no
overhead, however, since unlike SC, D2D users are not required to establish direct contact
with the BS. Computational effort is also much less than that of SC.
• The performance of GQL algorithm is inferior to the performance of CB. This is mainly due
to the absence of forecasting and best-response dynamics. Note that in addition to aggregate
performance loss, simple -greedy algorithms without forecasting do not guarantee that the
game converge to an equilibrium.
• The main reason that NCB performs poor is that the collision is not allowed. In such
condition, even if it is better for D2D users to collide (similar to the result of Section
VI-A3, case 2), the approach makes them to choose different channels.
• Similar to GQL, AB does not exhibit good performance in comparison to CB. The reason
is obvious. While CB takes channel quality and availability into account, AB is only based
on channel availability. Intuitively, the performance of AB is in direct relation with channel
qualities. More precsiely, for channels with similar and/or large gains, the harmful effect of
ignoring channel qualities is alleviated. The advantagemof this approach is its zero overhead.
• Uniform random strategy yields the worst performance. However, it is also the simplest
approach, with respect to information flow and computational effort.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
We studied a channel selection problem in an underlay distributed D2D communication system.
In this model, spectrum vacancies of the cellular network are utilized by D2D users, thereby
boosting the spectrum efficiency and improving local services, with no adverse effect on cellular
users. Each D2D user aims at maximizing its performance given no prior information, and
achieving an equilibrium is beneficial for all users. We showed that the channel selection problem
boils down to a multi-player multi-armed bandit game with side information, and we proposed an
approach to solve this game by combining no-regret bandit learning with calibrated forecasting.
Analytically, we established that the proposed strategy is strongly-consistent; that is, for each
D2D user, the average accumulated reward in the long run is equal to that based on the best fixed
strategy in te sense of aggregate average reward. Moreover, we proved that the proposed approach
converges to an equilibrium in some sense. Numerical analysis verified analytical results.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
We follow a root suggested in [32]. Suppose that limT→∞ Sκ,T = 1 holds. In order to prove
limT→∞ Sκ′,T = 1, it is sufficient to show that after some finite time, the actions taken by the
player based on Pt are equal to those based on δdt . By (7), we know that, with probability 1,
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there exists an ν > 0 so that after a time point θ <∞,
|Pt − δdt| < ν (14)
holds for all t > θ (see also Theorem 2). At the same time, according to our system model and
by Assumption A1, the reward functions are bounded, and the action space and memory are
finite. This implies that if (14) holds, then the actions of the player evolve as if it were aware
of the true joint action profile of its opponents. Hence the lemma follows.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
From Algorithm 2, at each period r, dT ′r · Zre trials are selected for exploration by each player.
At each one of these trials, with probability 1 − γ, an arm m is selected equally at random.
Since these processes are independent, the probability that arm m is pulled at some exploration
trial yields 1−γ
M
. Now, let
{
W
(m)
t
}T
t=1
be a sequence of random variables, where W (m)t = 1 if
arm m is played at time t, and W (m)t = 0 otherwise, and the outcomes W
(m)
t are independent
over time. In the worst-case, arm m never becomes the best-response, and hence its chance of
being played is limited to exploration trials. As a result, Pr
[
W
(m)
t = 1
]
= 1−γ
M
, and the sum of
probabilities for the event W (m)t = 1 yields
∑T
t=1 Pr [Wt = 1] =
1−γ
M
∑R
r=1 dT ′r · Zre. By using
Assumption A3 and Lemma 1, we conclude that limT→∞
∑T
t=1 Pr [Wt = 1]→∞. Thus, by the
second Borel-Cantelli lemma ( [32], [37]), it follows that the probability of arm m being pulled
infinitely often equals 1. On the other hand, players select their actions independently. As such,
the probability of playing each joint action profile is given by 1−γ
MK
. By the same argumentation,
each joint action profile is also played infinitely often. Hence, the Lemma is proved.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Since the proof is identical for all players, we prove the strong-consistency for some player
k, and hence omit the player’s subscript, k, for brevity. It should be mentioned that the proof is
inspired by [29], where the authors showed the consistency of an allocation rule for single-player
contextual bandit games, which, similar to our algorithm, follows the GLIE rule.
In the following, we consider a selection strategy χ′, which is identical to χ, except that at
each time t and before taking any action, the player is informed about the true joint action
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profile of other K − 1 players, that is k−t . We prove that χ′ is strongly-consistent. Therefore,
from Lemma 2 it follows that χ is strongly-consistent, as well.
In what follows, mt is used to denote the selected arm at time t, while mˆt stands for the arm
with the highest estimated expected reward at time t. That is, at time t we have fˆmˆt(k
−
t ) :=
maxm∈{1,..,M} fˆm(k−t ). Moreover, m∗t denotes the arm with the highest true expected reward at
time t so that fm∗t (k
−
t ) := maxm∈{1,..,M} fm(k
−
t ). Ties are broken using some deterministic rule.
From Definition 1, Sχ′,T is upper bounded by 1. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove a lower
bound on Sχ′,T that converges to 1 as T →∞. To this end, we rewrite Sχ′,T as [29]
Sχ′,T =
∑T
t=1 fmˆt(k
−
t )∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
+
∑T
t=1(fmt(k
−
t )− fmˆt(k−t ))∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
≤ 1. (15)
By Assumption A1, it follows from (15) that
Sχ′,T ≥
∑T
t=1 fmˆt(k
−
t )∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
−
1
T
∑T
t=1BI{mt 6=mˆt}
1
T
∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
. (16)
The remainder of the proof consists of two parts. In the first part we show that
1
T
∑T
t=1BI{mt 6=mˆt}
1
T
∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
a.s.→ 0, as T →∞, (17)
while the second part deals with∑T
t=1 fmˆt(k
−
t )∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
a.s.→ 1, as T →∞. (18)
Combining (17) and (18) with (16) and Sχ′,T ≤ 1 proves the strong consistency.
(i) By Assumption A1,
∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t ) is positive. As a result,
1
T
∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t ) converges to
Et
{
fm∗t (k
−
t )
}
> 0 almost surely. Hence, it suffices to show that 1
T
∑T
t=1BI{mt 6=mˆt} → 0, almost
surely. To show this, we consider the worst-case; that is, we assume that in all exploration trials,
inferior arms are selected (i.e. the best-response is never selected by chance). Therefore
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
BI{mt 6=mˆt} = lim
R→∞
∑R
r=1 dT ′rZre∑R
r=1 T
′
r
= 0, (19)
where the second equality follows from Assumption A3 and Lemma 1. This proves (17).
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(ii) First, we note that (18) is equivalent to [29]7∑T
t=1(fmˆt(k
−
t )− fm∗t (k−t ))∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
a.s.→ 0, as T →∞. (20)
Moreover, by (15), (16) and (17), we conclude that∑T
t=1(fmˆt(k
−
t )− fm∗t (k−t ))∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
≤ 0. (21)
Clearly,
fmˆt(k
−
t )− fm∗t (k−t ) = fmˆt(k−t )− fˆmˆt,t−1(k−t ) + fˆmˆt,t−1(k−t )
− fˆm∗t ,t−1(k−t ) + fˆm∗t ,t−1(k−t )− fm∗t (k−t ).
(22)
On the other hand, for every trial t, fˆmˆt,t−1(k
−
t ) ≥ fˆm∗t ,t−1(k−t ) holds. Hence we can write [29]
fmˆt(k
−
t )− fm∗t (k−t )
≥ fmˆt(k−t )− fˆmˆt,t−1(k−t )− fm∗t (k−t ) + fˆm∗t ,t−1(k−t )
≥ −2 sup
1≤m≤M
∥∥∥fˆm,t−1(k−t )− fm(k−t )∥∥∥∞ .
(23)
This yields ∑T
t=1(fmˆt(k
−
t )− fm∗t (k−t ))∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
≥
−2
T
∑T
t=1 sup1≤m≤M
∥∥∥fˆm,t−1(k−t )− fm(k−t )∥∥∥∞
1
T
∑T
t=1 fm∗t (k
−
t )
.
(24)
For brevity, let us rewrite (24) in a shorter form as a ≥ b. By Assumption A2, ‖fˆm,T (k−) −
fm(k
−)‖∞ → 0 as T → ∞. However, in order to use this assumption, we need to ensure that
not only each arm, but also each joint action profile is played infinitely many times, as T →∞.
This is established in Lemma 3. Therefore, the right-hand side of (24) converges to zero, i.e.
b → 0 and hence a ≥ 0. On the other hand, by (21), the left-hand side is upper-bounded by
zero, that is a ≤ 0. As a result, (20) follows, which completes the second part of the proof.
7This part of the proof is almost identical to [29]; the difference is that here we use the fact that each action and also each
joint action profile is played infinitely often (Lemma 3) in order to complete the proof.
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D. Proof of Theorem 4
Consider a K-player MAB game, as described in Section III-A. By Theorem 1, if each player
plays by best responding to a calibrated forecast of the joint action profile of opponents, then
inf
pi∈C
∑
m
|pˆiT (m)− pi(m)| → 0, (25)
as T → ∞. We refer to this selection strategy as χ′. In order to prove the Theorem, we show
that our strategy χ, in which the true expected rewards of joint action profiles are not known
and are gradually learned by exploration, exhibits the same convergence characteristics as χ′.
First, we re-arrange the K-player MAB game to a two-agent game where the first agent is
any player k and the second agent is the set of its opponents, i.e. the set of K − 1 players.
For this game, any joint action profile of the two agents can be written as (m,m−), where
m ∈ {1, ...,M} and m− ∈⊗K−1k=1 {1, ...,M}. Let pˆiT (m,m−) denote the fraction of time until
T in which some joint action (m,m−) is played. According to selection strategy χ, pˆiT (m,m−)
can be written as
pˆiT (m,m−) = pˆiT,r(m,m−) + pˆiT,i(m,m−), (26)
where pˆiT,r(m,m−) and pˆiT,i(m,m−) denote the fractions of time in which (m,m−) is played by
exploration (i.e. by chance), and by exploitation (i.e. according to the best response rule given
by (10)), respectively. According to Algorithm 2, the total number of exploration trials is given
by
∑R
r=1 dT ′rZre. Moreover, by Assumption A3, we know
lim
R→∞
∑R
r=1 dT ′rZre∑R
r=1 T
′
r
= 0. (27)
This implies that
pˆiT,r(m,m−) = 0, (28)
for T →∞. Therefore, in the limit, pˆiT,r(m,m−) can be neglected when calculating the empirical
frequencies of plays, and
pˆiT (m,m−) = pˆiT,i(m,m−) (29)
holds asymptotically.
In order to complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that after some finite time, the actions
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taken by the player based on fˆm,k,t are equal to those based on fm,k. By Assumption A1, we
know that, with probability 1, there exists an ν > 0 so that for every m ∈ {1, ...,M} and after
a time point θ <∞,
‖fˆm,k(k−)− fm,k(k−)‖ < ν, (30)
holds for all t > θ. At the same time, according to our system model and by Assumption A1, the
reward functions are bounded, and the action space and memory are finite. This implies that if
(30) holds, then the actions of the player evolve as if it were aware of the true expected reward
of each joint action profile, which completes the proof.
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